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what US policies were, how they were made, and on what assumptions they were based. I have also tried to set forth the social, cultural, psychological, and historical factors that gave rise to these assumptions.
The beginning of the crisis
The Congo became independent from Belgian colonial rule on June 30, 1960 
US policy
What were the main options for American policy? Basically, there were three possible courses of action, as has been clearly summarized by George W. Ball: the US could do nothing, it could agree to the Cabinet request for American troops, or it could encourage a move into Congo by the United Nations. 10 The US exercised the third option and chose to tackle the Congo's chaos by a hastily assembled international peace force. Why did it do so? What factors influenced the decision-making process? And how did the interagency process affect this choice?
On the eve of its Independence, American officials viewed the Congo in light of two broad assumptions that were to influence their interpretations of individual events and the selection of alternative policies. These assumptions were shaped by social, cultural, psychological, and historical factors. defer to its allies. Since Belgium had the major interest in the Congo, the US government considered she would take care of whatever problems developed; America's role would be largely that of an understanding friend.
The US policy in the summer of 1960 showed the primary occupation of the policy-makers in preventing Soviet penetration and preserving the goodwill of NATO allies. Where the two considerations clashed, the communist danger was given priority. A brief illustration of these findings is in order.
The assumptions -Arguments
The first reactions of the United States government after the start of the turmoil stressed This last alternative would give the Russians an excuse to offer a contingent themselves -either to the Congo government or a fraction thereof, either now or in the future. Besides, the US was not anxious for a heavy involvement in mid-Africa, an area outside the line of direct military responsibility and lacking substantial American investment. 17 Nor was it likely that Congress would approve an expeditionary force in Africa, especially when its immediate purpose was to restore order rather than to resist Communist aggression. Letting the UN stop the riot through a peacekeeping force which excluded the great powers, seemed the most reasonable course, since it promised to block chaos and Communism at a relatively small cost to the United States. Thus, the United Nations would be the "umbrella" for US anti-Communist policy in the Congo. 18 Even as Herter was conferring with Hammarskjöld on means of injecting the UN into the situation, the US underlined its fear of Soviet intervention by dispatching the aircraft carrier
Wasp to the Congo coast. Officially the mission was to evacuate American civilians if needed. 19 In reality there was a strong political motive. Eisenhower writes that while we sent no combat troops to the Congo, "we did station an attack carrier near the mouth of the Congo River. The NATO allies did not support these resolutions.
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US policies also showed deference to the policies of Belgium where these policies did not conflict with the desire to prevent Russian penetration. Washington approved the use of UN forces partly because Belgium had requested so on July 12. The US argued that Belgium had a constructive role to play in the Congo. In the UN debates, the US delegate sought to prevent Belgium from being branded as an aggressor. US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the Security Council promptly dismissed any charges of Belgian aggression and insisted that the Belgian troops would be withdrawn if and when the UN forces were strong enough to restore order. 23 The US government was therefore most satisfied with the policy of the UN SecretaryGeneral at this stage of the Congo crisis.
However, the possible Soviet penetration remained the main US preoccupation. This concern culminated in a fierce reaction when by mid-August 1960, Lumumba accepted unilateral which he stressed that, in the view of "high quarters here", Lumumba's "removal must be an urgent and prime objective." Devlin was given still "wider authority…including more aggressive action" than he had been given before in order to remove Lumumba. 27 Shortly after Dulles' cable to Leopoldville, CIA scientists began preparing a deadly poison that was to be put into Lumumba's food. This "first aid kit" was flown to Leopoldville in September. 28 It would be the first of three American attempts to kill Lumumba.
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Factors that shaped the assumptions
In retrospect, the decision to assassinate Lumumba seems puzzling. Soviet intervention was certainly cause for concern, but hardly for panic. By the time the Soviet planes and crews arrived in Leopoldville, a UN army of 10,000 had already been assembled to keep the peace. Under these circumstances, the possibility that 100 Soviet and Czech technicians could pull off a "classic communist takeover" was remote, to say the least. Why, then, the decision to assassinate Lumumba? The answer, in my opinion, has to do with human overreaction: overreaction by an administration as a result of the social, cultural, psychological, and historical factors that shaped the assumptions of the officials and that blinded their judgment, not only with regard to Lumumba, but in the whole decision-making process during the beginning of the Congo crisis.
Responsibility for the Congo policy belonged to a small group of high-level officials who Especially, this last incident left the President furious at the Russians and bitterly resigned to the hopelessness of achieving peace in what remained of his presidency. In this context, the perception of Lumumba became very troubling. Although he was considered the most capable politician in the Congo -he even had been the "unofficial" American candidate for premier in the spring of 1960 -and although he never publicly denounced the US, not even after his appeals for aid were turned down in Washington, no considered profile of Lumumba ever emerged from the NSC deliberations or from communications to the field, but rather an assortment of negative labels that descriptively ascended over time. At first, Lumumba was "radical" politically. Then, by some leap of perception, he became a "dangerous Marxist." His acceptance of Soviet aid revealed him as a "Soviet instrument" according to Eisenhower and endowed him with a "harrowing background" according to CIA Director Dulles. Dulles found it also "safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba had been bought by the communists". The role of the CIA in shaping the perceptions about Lumumba was very important and favored the decision for his removal. 34 The Agency stressed more than once the analogy of Cuba, which by a single caricature obscured a multitude of Congolese realities.
Other players
The The same report also revealed that, although there is no suggestion of Washington's involvement in the final plot, the CIA was fully informed of Lumumba's transfer and the possible consequences. 
